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ABSTRACT
Allocation of transboundary water  resources involves not only the competing parties divided by 
geographic  and  administrative boundaries  (regional,  national  and  local boundaries) but  also 
various sectors  (agricultural, urban,  and  industrial  etc.)  and  various  time  periods  (monthly, 
seasonal, annual). This study uses the Inter-Temporal Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model 
(ITETRBM), which is a linear programming model maximizing net economic benefit derived 
from  energy  generation, agricultural  and urb an uses after c onveyance costs. While optimally 
allocating water resources, The ITETRBM enables to pursue various sensitivity analyses in order 
to  measure the  impacts  of  annual  changes  in  energy  and  water demand over  the countries 
(Turkey, Syria, Iraq) and sectors (agriculture, urban) in the Euphrates and Tigris River Basin 
(ETRB). The results present that i) energy and agriculture are two different sectors potentially 
compete one other, and ii) that competition opens a wide spectrum of water and energy policies 
in t he  basin among  all  countries.  The spectrum  of policies  may cover the  issues of a)  time 
preferences of energy generation via hydroelectric power plants especially in the relatively cold 
upstream countries and b) utilization of alternative energy recourses and their preferential uses in 
upstream  and  downstream  countries.  While  managing  agriculture  and  energy  sectors,  an 
integrative approach potentially brings a superior allocation solution that provides higher welfare 
to the basin countries.
Keywords: Linear programming; Energy versus agriculture; Transboundary water resources 
allocation; The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin.  1
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the today's era, where the global climatic change is being discussed, the rational and equitable 
use of water resources of the world has an increasing importance. Especially, for the regions 
where the  water  is  sc arce, scientific  approaches  to handle  issues of  managing scarce  water 
resources  are  both  technical and  political  necessity.  The water resources  not acknowledging 
human made political and administrative boundaries (Dellapenna 2007) have a potential to bring 
many parties into collaboration and peace, but also,have apotential to tak e them to the conflict, 
even war. Transboundary water resources issues are not limited to the Euphrates and Tigris River 
Basin  (ETRB),  which  is the topic of  this study, but also are  relevant to  261  surface  water 
resources basins in the world (Dinaret al. 2007).
The political boundaries, not only create artificial thresholds or barriers to efficient and effective 
use of water  resources,  but also cause competition  and conflicts over the allocation of them 
among multiple parties. Overcoming these barriers and thresholds can only be possible via an 
integrated water resources basin management approach. Founding an integrated water resources 
basin  management  or ganization  is relatively  easier  when  the  stakeholders  are  in  the  same
country, where there exist an agreed legal system. But resources allocation at the international 
level is a daunting task due to absence of an agreed international legal system and enforcement 
power. Handling the issues and laying out the possibilities through a scientific methodology will 
always contribute to the negotiation and agreement of all parties.
Allocation of transboundary water resources are not only among the geographically identified 
parties but also among the various sectors, even among different time periods due to periodical 
fluctuations in year(s). While the process of allocation taking place simultaneously in these three 
dimensions, the policies of water uses affect directly and indirectly all parties and sectors in the 
basin. This study uses the Inter-Temporal Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ITETRBM), 
which  is  a linear programming model  (Kucukmehmetoglu 2009).  The fluctuations  in annual 
energy demand are incorporated into the optimization model, and their effects on water resources 
allocations among parties (Turkey, Syria, Iraq) and sectors (energy, urban and agriculture) are 
analyzed over the case of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.2
2. LITERATURE 
In the literature, the studies on the transboundary resources allocation can be classified into two 
broad categories ofverbal and technical studies. While the verbal literature focusing on the legal 
and political aspects of the issues, the technical one dwells on the quantitative modeling aspects. 
It  is  noteworthy  to  mention  that  these  studies  are  not  totally  mutually  exclusive,  and  the 
quantitative  models  support verbal studies and  enable  parties  understand  the  nature  of  the 
problem s.      
At the international level, though have not been accepted by all countries, the most well-known 
legal document is “the Draft Articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses”by the UN in 1994. Some of the studies outlining the legal framework are Dinar et 
al. (2007), Margesson (1997), Wolf (1997), Flint (1995), Tanzi (1997a & 1997b) and Arcari 
(1997). The policy oriented studies are mostly on the specific topics and/or basins. Some of those 
are Kolars & Mitchell (1991), Biswas (1994), Kliot (1994), and Naff (1994). 
The technical studies can be classified into two headings: The first one is based on optimization
leading efficient uses and allocation of limited water resources; and the second one is on the 
game  theory that  systematically  lists  the  strategies  of  involving  parties.  Those  strategies 
formulize and enlist the individual, sub-group, and grand coalition behaviors of involving parties 
with their associated benefits and costs. The first optimization study, though is not on water 
resources allocation, is developed by Samuelson (1952), and later Takayama & Judge (1964)
elaborate mathematical modeling aspects of the literature. Then, the developed models has been a 
base on a hypothetic water resources model by Flinn & Guise (1970). Later, Booker & Young 
(1994),  Becker  (1995),  Rogers  (1969,  1993),  Dinar  &  Wolf  (1994a,  1994b), and 
Kucukmehmetoglu &  Guldmann  (2004)  have  developed  specific  models  focusing  on 
transboundary water resources allocation issues of various basins in the world. In the mean time, 
there are also increasing number of game theoretic analyses built on or be complementary parts 
of  optimization  researches.  The first  game  theoretic  model  is developed  by  Rogers (1969). 
Afterward, Rogers (1993), Dinar & Wolf (1994a, b), Kucukmehmetoglu & Guldmann (2004), 
Kucukmehmetoglu (2009), Kucukmehmetoglu et al. (2010), and Wu & Whittington (2006) have 
pursued various studies on cooperative game theoretic aspects of the water resources allocation 
issues.   3
Kucukmehmetoglu (2002) has developed the first game theoretic transboundary water resources 
optimization  model on  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris.  This  study  is  f ollowed  by  i) 
Kucukmehmetoglu & Guldmann (2004) that is a slightly modified version of Kucukmehmetoglu
(2002) for an academic publication; ii) Kucukmehmetoglu & Guldmann (2010) that generates 
three party Pareto frontier i.e. tradeoff surface (PFS) among the three riparian countries, and tries 
to find politically acceptable allocation via analyses using political weights and marginal values 
impacts of countries each other; iii) Kucukmehmetoglu (2009) thatevaluates the impacts of built-
up active reservoir capacities for an inter-temporal allocation, measures the potential benefits of 
them to the upstream and downstream countries, and presents the political advantages of built 
reservoirs  to  the  ow ner  of  these reservoir  and  to  the  basin  during  water  shortage;  iv) 
Kucukmehmetoglu et al. (2010) that aims at finding the most acceptable allocation scenario by 
means of a developed fuzzy logic model considering the variations in annual tributary flows and 
game theory based allotments from the varying core solutions.
Beyond these researches, this study methodologically evaluates the likely impacts of changes in 
national  energy  demands  on  agriculture,  and  presents  the  possible  competition  between 
agriculture and energy sectors. In the analyses, the advantages and disadvantages of an integrated 
and disintegrated basin management to the parties and to the overall performance of basin are 
presented. Finally, considering their outcomes, a series of policy suggestions are proposed.
3. THE INTER-TEMPORAL EUPHRATES & TIGRIS RIVER BASIN MODEL 
(ITETRBM)
The ITETRBM is an optimization model, which is inspired from the Colorado River Institutional 
Model (CRIM) developed by Booker and Young (1994). Their work aims at allocating scarce 
water  resources  among  the states  by  fulfilling  the  international  allocation  agreements  with
Mexico. Similarly, the ITETRBM optimally allocates scarce water resources in the ETRB among 
Turkey-Syria-Iraq. The used model is a linear programming model that has similar character with 
Becker (1999) in terms of the nature of objective function. As an extension of the ETRBM, the 
ITETRBM  enables  inter-temporal  water  resources  allocation among the  multiple periods by 
means of reservoirs in the basin (Kucukmehmetoglu 2009). By this model, the potential political 4
and economic advantages of the reservoirs are presented, and alleviation of water shortage by the 
water stored in rainy season is shown in the economic terms.
The network structure of the ITETRBM: The ITETRBM contains 63 demand and 45 supply 
nodes. Their allocations by countries and schematic structure of the ITETRBM are presented in 
Figure 1. Among demand nodes, the 37 of themare assigned to agriculture, and remaining the 26 
of them are to the urban demand nodes. The 24, 16, and remaining 23 of these demand nodes are 
respectively in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Similarly, the 15, 7, and remaining 22 of the supply nodes 
are respectively in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. In order to transfer water from the Tigris to the 
Euphrates, there are three inter-basin links, one of which is from Turkey to Syria (21→12) and 





















































































































Kucukmehmetoglu (2002) p.96, Kucukmehmetoglu & 
Guldmann (2004) p.786.
Period: t Period: t+1
Qj-2,j-1,t + RFj-1,t + T j-1,t Qj-2,j-1,t+1 + RFj-1,t+1 + T j-1,t+1
W i,j-1,t ELj-1 Wi,j-1,t+1 EL j-1
RS j-1,t-1 RS j-1,t RS j-1,t+1
RFj,t Tj,t RFj,t+1 Tj,t+1
W i,j,t Qj-1,j,t EL j Wi,j,t+1 Qj-1,t+1 EL j
RS j,t-1 RS j,t RS j,t+1
Q j,j+1,t Qj,j+1,t+1
j-1, t j-1,t +1
j, t  j, t+1
Kucukmehmetoglu (2009) p.3077.
Figure 1 – The network structure of the 
ITETRBM
Figure 2 – The flow balance in the ITETRBM5
The mathematical character of the ITETRBM: The ITETRBM is  an improved version of the 
original ETRBM in Ku cukmehmetoglu (2002) via incorporation of time dimension. The basic 
mo del,  while  maximizing  net  economic  benefit,  optimally  allocates wa ter  resources  among 
energy, urban, and agricultural uses net of conveyance costs. The inter-temporal nature of the 
mo del enables to store water during wet seasons for dry periods. As used in Kucukmehmetoglu 
(2009) and Kucukmehmetoglu et al. (2010), Equation (1) with alternative (a,b) and partial forms 
(c,d,e) is  the objective function to be maximized subject to constraints presented by Equations 
(2)-(5)  in the ITETRBM.
1 As presented in Kucukmehmetoglu et al. (2010), the mathematical 
details of the ITETRBM with updates in energy price parameter (Pet) areas follows: 
Maximize
NEB = ∑t{∑iagVag ∑jWjit- ∑j,  iag Cag  Dji  Wjit  + ∑iurVur ∑jWjit
                 - ∑j, iur Cur Dji  Wjit    + ∑j,lPet  Ej  Qjlt    
                 - [(Q28,14,t Css L28,14) + (Q31,16,t CssL31,16) + (Q21,12,t Css L21,12)]} (1a)
     equivalently (assuming WGT=WGS=WGI=1)
NEB= NEBTSI  = WGTNEBT+ WGSNEBS+ WGINEBI (1b)
      where:
NEBT = ∑t{∑iTAVTA ∑jWjit - ∑j, iTA CTA  Dji  Wjit  + ∑ iTUVTU ∑jWjit
                 - ∑j, iTU CTU  Dji Wjit    + ∑j,l PTEt Ej  Qjlt    
                 - [(Q28,14,t Css L28,14) + (Q31,16,t CssL31,16) + (Q21,12,t Css L21,12)]} (1c)
NEBS = ∑t{∑iSAVSA ∑jWjit- ∑j, iSA CSA  Dji Wjit  + ∑iSUVSU ∑jWjit
                 - ∑j, iSU CSU Dji  Wjit    + ∑j,l PSEt  Ej Qjlt    
                 - [(Q28,14,t Css L28,14) + (Q31,16,t CssL31,16) + (Q21,12,t Css L21,12)]} (1d)
NEBI = ∑t{∑iIAVIA ∑jWjit - ∑j, iIA CIA  Dji  Wjit  + ∑iIUVIU ∑jWjit
                 - ∑j, iIU CIU Dji  Wjit    + ∑j,l PIEt  Ej  Qjlt    
                 - [(Q28,14,t Css L28,14) + (Q31,16,t CssL31,16) + (Q21,12,t Css L21,12)]} (1e)
Subject to:
∑i Wjit+l Qjlt+ELjt+RSjt = iRFij (∑j Wjit)+Tjt+l Qljt+RSjt-1          j & t         (2)
Minagt Si  ≤  ∑j Wjit  ≤  Maxagt Si   i  ag,    t       (3)
Minurt Si  ≤  ∑j Wjit  ≤  Maxurt Si   i  ur,   t             (4)
RSjt ≤ RCj   j & t                  (5)
where Equation (1a) represents the objective function in terms of the net economic benefits , NEB. 
Vag[ur] is the unit value of water to agriculture [urban]; Wjit is the amount of water transferred 
from node j to node i in period t, and ∑jWjit show s the amount of water used for agricultural 
                                                   
1 For variables, parameters, and indices in the model please refer Appendix A.6
[urban] activities at node i at time t. The total value of the water at i and time t is Vag[ur]∑jWjit, 
and  the  total  value  of  the  water  to  all  agricultural  [urban]  nodes  is  e xpressed  as 
iag[ur]Vag[ur]∑jWjit.  Dji and Cag[ur] are the distances between the nodes, and the transportation 
cost  per  unit  distance,  respectively;  the  total  cost  of  transporting  water  to  node  i is  j
WjitDjiCag[ur], and the total water transportation cost to all agricultural [urban] nodes is iag[ur]j
WjitDjiCag[ur]. Although the unit cost/benefit values change from country to country and season 
to season, due to the data unavailability, they are considered herein as constants, but with the data 
availability such changes can be incorporated into the model without additional difficulty. Thus, 
in period t, the net benefits of water usage in the agricultural [urban] sector is,
∑ iag Vag·(∑jWjit) - ∑j, iag Cag·Dji·Wjit    (6)
∑ iurVur·(∑jWjit) - ∑j, iurCur ·Dji·Wjit     (7)
Pet is the unit market price of generated energy in period t; Ej is  the am ount of energy 
generation per unit of water release at node j; and Qjlt the flow of water into downstream node l
from node j at time t;  PetEjQjlt show s the value of the energy generated at node j during water 
release to downstream node l, Hence, the total value of generated energy in the basin at time t is , 
∑j,l Pet·Ej ·Qjlt     (8)
For the inter-basin water transfer links and their associated costs, let Qjlt be the flow of water 
from node jinto downstream node l at time t, Djl  the distance between the supply nodes, and Css
the transportation cost per unit distance and amount between the two river basins. As there are 
only three links, they are explicitly represented by the corresponding node indices for period t. 
These costs are assigned to water recipient country. Let Q21,12,t be the water flowing at time t
from the Tigris in Turkey, to the Euphrates in Syria, over the link from nodes j=21 to j=12, and 
Q28,14,t and Q31,16,t  the water flows over the links from node j=28 to j=14 and from node  j=31 to
j=16, both from the Tigris to the Euphrates within Iraq. Let Ljl be the length of links from node j
to node l. The transportation cost for link j-l is , then, computed as QjltCssLjl. At time t, the total 
inter-basi n link cost is then calculated as follows. 
(Q28,14,t CssL28,14) + (Q31,16,tCssL31,16) + (Q21,12,tCssL21,12)   (9)
The sum of benefits and costs in Equations (6)-(9) constitutes the objective function as given in 
Equation (1a). Later, in order  to differentiate  energy prices  for different  countries, the same 
objective function is divided into three mutually exclusive parts reflecting the country benefits 7
separately.  Then,  indices  are  adjusted  regarding  the  country  sunsets:  TA(i)  is indices for 
agriculture in Turkey,SA(i) for agriculture in Syria,and IA(i) for agriculture in Iraq; In the same 
way, TU(i) is  indices for urban in Turkey, SU(i) for urban in Syria, and IU(i) for urban in Iraq. 
Equation (1b) is for separate country benefits with weight multipliers (WGT, WGS, WGI), which 
may take 0 or1. In order to obtain the same net economic value from Equations (1a) and (1b), 
weights are required to be 1 for each country. These weights ar e used to include or exclude 
country or  countries  from  objective functions.  Equations (1c)-(1e) are the country details of 
Equations (1a) and (1b) as their country subsets. Those separated objective functions also enable 
to assign different energy prices in different countries: TEt is  indices for energy price in Turkey 
at time t,SEt for energy price in Syria at time t, IEt for energy price in Iraq at time t.
Equation (2) and Figure 2 present the water balance and its diagrammatic form. Water leaving 
node j at time t (the left hand side of the equation) is made up of reservoir evaporation ELjt, 
reservoir storage for use in the next period, RS jt, water withdrawal for agricultural and urban uses 
Wjit, and water release to downstream nodes Qjt, which is equal to l Qljt. The total water delivery 
to demand node i at time t is ∑jWjit, which is the sum of the deliveries Wjit from all supply nodes j
to node iat time t. Accordingly the total amount of water leaving node jat time t is given as,
∑iWjit  + l Qjlt  + ELjt +  RSjt (10)
Right hand side of Equation (2) shows the water inputs to supply node j at time t, which are the 
sub-drainage basin inflows Tjt, the water stored (i.e. transferred to period t) in the reservoir jfrom 
earlier period at time t-1 RSjt-1, the total of return flows from the upstream withdrawals to supply 
node  j at time  t (RFTj-1,t)  taken as the sum of  the products of return flow  rates  (RFij)  and 
withdrawals (∑jWjit) at node iat time t i RFij∑jWjit, and water from upstream nodes l to jat time 
t  l Qljt. As can be seen visually in Figure 2, the total input at node jat time t is,
i RFij(∑jWjit )  + Tjt + l Qljt  + RSjt-1 (11)
Equations (10) and (11) make the water balance constraint in Equation (2) for each supply node j, 
at time t. Equations (3) and (4) are designed to control the minimum and maximum total water 
withdrawal at node j at time t, j Wjit.  Si is  a size parameter for demand node i refers hectare for 
agricultural nodes or inhabitants for urban nodes. Min agt and Minurt are minimum usage rates to 
sustain agricultural and  urban activities,  and Maxagt and Maxurt are  maximum usage rates to 
prevent excessive withdrawals at time t. In the model application, Minagt and Minurt are set to be 
zero  in  order to  prevent  negativity  and  not  to  force  irrational  water  withdrawals,  such  as 8
providing water for far away demand nodes. The ITETRBM optimizes only available resources 
to measure the impacts of available water resources in the basin. Given that RCj is the reservoir 
capacity for each node j, and RSjt is  the water stored in reservoir node j at time t for the next 
period, Equation (5) provides a reservoir capacity constraint at node j at time t. A total list of 
indices, variables, and parameters are presented in Appendix A.  Assumptions concerning the 
basic system parameters and the necessary data for model execution are presented in Appendix B 
similar to Kucukmehmetoglu (2002, 2009), Kucukmehmetoglu & Gu ldmann (2004).
Data  &  Assumptions: Except  the differences in  the  number  of  the  period  and  associated 
periodical differences in demands, tributary flows, evaporation levels, time based parameters, all 
data sources  and  assumptions  remain the same as  in  Kucukmehmetoglu  (2009).  They  are  as 
follows: It i s a ssumed in the ITETRBM that the planned dams are completed and all irrigable 
lands are developed  by  the year  2040.  Current populations  are projected  to  the year  2040, 
assuming that the current growth rates remain constant (Kucukmehmetoglu 2002). For the inter-
temporal nature of the ITETRBM the year is divided into periods (for this study 12 months). In 
the process of developing the ITETRBM, due to the lack of adequate data on the Euphrates and 
the Tigris, some of the necessary parameters are adopted from earlier studies conducted in some 
of the Middle East countries and the U.S.A. The supply figures are derived from Kolars (1986, 
1992, 1994), Kolars & Mitchell (1991), Kliot (1994), and Bağış (1989); the demand figures are 
drawn from Bağış (1989), Kolars & Mitchell  (1991), Kolars (1994, 1992, 1986), Kliot (1994), 
FAO (1993), Altinbilek (1997), and www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Asia/ ; a gricultural and 
urban water use figures are adjusted from the studies of Howitt et al. (1982), and Dinar & Wolf 
(1994a); the cost of water transfers and energy are drawn from Hirshleifer et al. (1969), Gibbons 
(1986), and Bilen (1994). Adding time dimension to the model requires additional data:Reservoir 
capacity figures are obtained from Altinbilek (1997, 2004) and UNEP (2001), tributary flows by 
periods from Kliot (1994), seasonal evaporation figures from a study done over the Nile by 
Hurst (1952), urban and agricultural demand figures by periods from İlhan & Utku (1998) and 
İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi (İSKİ) (2004). Detailed explanations on these parameters are 
available in Appendix B. Additional major assumptions are as follows: The base model does not 
consider geographic variations  in t he  values  of urban and agricultural consumptions, energy 
prices, and transportation  costs.  These variables also vary  with time,  technology, alternative 
energy  resources  availability,  levels  of  economic  and  socio-cultural  development  and  their 9
characteristics. Due to linear nature of ITETRBM, it is necessary to enforce withdrawal limit of 
each demand node  to eliminate excessive and  irrational water  withdrawals. These  limits  are 
designed on per capita and hectare bases for urban and agricultural demand nodes, respectively. 
4. MODEL APPLICATIONS
In the ITETRBM application process, the temporal nature of the model covers 12 consecutive 
mo nthly periods that the first month is November, and the last month is October. The single year 
mo del uses only active reservoir capacities (ARC) filled by accumulated water in that year. For 
the anal yses, whatever accumulated in that year is used in the same year without extending into
mu ltiyear temporal allocations.  In the evaluations,  as can be seen  in Table  1,  there are two 
scenario dimensions: The first one is the ma nagement (by rows), and the second one is the 
energy demand (by columns).  
Table 1 – Model application scenarios
Management Scenarios
Energy Demand Scenarios
C: Constant in the Basin V: Variable in the Basin
I: Integrated IC IV
D: Disintegrated DC DV
The management dimension contains of two scenarios: The first scenario is the integrated (I) one 
(Figure 3a)  that assumes  the  ETRB  is  managed by  a si ngle  authority, and  all  resources  are 
optimally  used  without considering countries a nd their priorities;  the  second scenario  is  t he 
disintegrated (D) one that first Turkey uses the resources in the basin considering her priorities, 
then Syria, and then Iraq (Figure 3b). For the sequential optimization runs presented in Figure 3b, 
only  country  based  subsets,  parameters,  and  variables  are  used  for  sequential  country 
optimizations ( 1st Turkey, 2nd Syria, and 3rd Iraq). Besides, the return flows from upstream 
countries  and  water  releases  from  their border  are  considered  as  inputs  for  the  relevant 
downstream country (first Syria, then Iraq).   























Figure 3 – Management scenarios for ETB: (a) Integrated; (b) Disintegrated
(Derived f rom Kucukmehmetoglu et al.2010)
The energy demand dimension contains two scenarios: The first scenario assumes that there is an 
invariant energy price (Petis constant - C) throughout the basin; the secondscenario assumes that 
upstream  country  Turkey  is  an  energy poor  country,  and during  low  temperature the energy 
prices  in crease s  (PTEt is  variant  - V).  In  contrast,  the  downstream  countries  are  energy  rich 
countries that any changes in the temperature do not have any price effect. The rule for energy 
price change in Turkey is: Considering the monthly average temperature figures between year 
1970 and 2000, for those months in which average temperature is below 15˚C, energy prices ($25 
MWh) is increased. The temperature elasticity of energy price is assumed to be -1, and then the 
computed prices are shown in Table 2.    



























8.3 4.1 1.9 2.9 6.3 11.7 16.3 20.7 23.9 23.5 19.7 14.3
Price (PTE t = $-MWh)** 36.2 43.2 46.8 45.2 39.5 30.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 26.2
Price (PSEt = $-MWh) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Price (PIEt = $-MWh) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
*Source: http://www.dmi.gov.tr/FILES/ziraat/2008yiliSicakliklarininAnalizi.pdf. (Last access October 2010)
** Turkey’s energy prices are derived with respect to the average temperatures (1971-2000).
   
In the model application section, primarily a base model assuming an integrated basin (I) and 
constant energy prices (C) is used, and its results are presented as a benchmark in order to show 
the impacts of alternative management and energy scenarios.  11
4.1. Benchmark Model Results
The benchmark model assumes that there is an integrated (I) the Euphrates and Tigris Basin 
(ETRB)  disregarding country specific objectives.  November  is  the  first period to accumulate 
water in the ARC, and October of the following year is the last period (12
nd month). Monthly the 
ITETRBM results are presented in Tables 3-4and Figures 4-8. 
The benchmark model results are presented in three steps: In the first step, there are monthly 
water allocations and accounting balance results; In the second step, there are monthly economic 
benefits with their associated sources; In the laststep, there are country based monthly economic 
benefits with their sources. These results later are used as a reference to make various sensitivity 
analyses.  

























Nov 2573 681 1273 0 1922 59 0
Dec 3302 794 0 1597 681 1685 133 0
Jan 4236 586 681 987 2433 2001 83 0
Feb 5260 573 2433 910 4674 1127 1555 0
Ma r 7079 699 4674 1242 10017 907 287 0
Apr 10324 1249 10017 2930 17749 657 255 0
May 15379 2636 17749 6887 27382 939 556 0
Jun 15437 4310 27382 11611 32951 1251 1316 0
Jul 9242 5242 32951 14245 30453 1534 1204 0
Aug 4203 6594 30453 18129 18179 1722 3221 0
Sep 2663 6293 18179 17270 5845 1940 2080 0
Oct 2220 3332 5845 8838 0 2033 526 0
Nov 0
Total 81920 32988 150364 85918 150364 17716 11274 0
Basin-Wide Water Use Figures: Table 3 shows both incoming and outgoing water from supply 
nodes with their sources, and Figure 4 visually presents the same values. The incoming waters (in 
black) are tributary inflows, return flows from withdrawals, and incoming (stored) water from 
earlier  periods.  The  outgoing  waters  (in  red)  are  water  withdrawals,  evaporation  from  the 
reservoirs, water stored in the reservoirs for the uses of next periods, and water releases to the 
Gu lf. In Figure 4, the values above the zero show the incoming water, and the values below zero 
present the outgoing water from the reservoirs. The bars presenting tributary inflows and water 12
withdrawals are not perfectly symmetric along the zero line, because the stored water in winter 
and spring is used in the coming summer and fall. In the mean time, the accumulated (stored)
water  figures  presented  in g reen  line is perfectly  counterparts  with  the  blue  line  showing 
accumulated (stored) wa ter ready to use with only one month lag. The accumulated water in the 
ARC enables seasonal shifts in water uses presented by bars. The same figure also presents, 
mo nthly return flows, evaporation levels, and water releases to the Gulf. At the end of the 12 
periods, all incoming water is used, water in ARC is totally consumed, and system’s in and out


























































































































Tributary inflows to ARC
Releases to the Gulf
Return flows
Evaporation form ARC
Stored water in ARC
Water ready to use in ARC
Figure 4 – Monthly in and out balances
Basin-Wide Economic Benefit Figures: Table 4 and Figure 5 present the net economic benefits 
from the application of the ITETRBM with their sources and associated costs. As designed in the 
basic optimization model, the net economic benefit is derived from energy generation, urban and 
agricultural  water  withdrawals.  Since energy  is  g enerated directly  from  water  releases  from 
reservoirs, energy components of the benefits do not have any cost component; however, urban 13
and agricultural withdrawals have associated  water conveyance costs as a function of distance. 
Net economic benefit from water withdrawal is estimated after water conveyance costs.
The Net Economic Benefit (NEB) from the ITETRBM is  found to be $2892.8x10
6 (Table 4). As 
can be seen from Table 4 and Figure 5, economic benefits from the urban uses present a uniform 
distribution between  months;  however,  energy  and  agricultural  water  use benefits  indicate  a 
synchronized seasonal fluctuation regarding the water demand in agriculture. During the water 
scarce period, the energy generation benefits increase due to uniformly priced energy. Uniform 
energy price in a year makes the optimization model delay hydroelectric generation until water is 
deficient  in a griculture  (in summer  and  autumn).  In  other  words,  water  releases  from  the 
upstream dams take place during the water scarce periods in order to be able to convey water to 
downstream agricultural districts. 
Later  in this study, uniformity assumption of the energy value is  relaxed  and its  effects on 
agriculture are measured.    




Sources of the Net Economic Benefit
Benefit Transport Cost
Water Withdrawal Energy Urban Agriculture
($) % ($) % ($) % ($) % ($) %
Nov 95793 3.31 97120 3.28 28778 2.48 14059 7.24 10258 1.00
Dec 118145 4.08 105136 3.55 40924 3.53 14042 7.23 13874 1.35
Jan 117506 4.06 91467 3.09 46213 3.98 14382 7.41 5792 0.56
Feb 144138 4.98 93567 3.16 78587 6.77 23679 12.20 4337 0.42
Ma r 168064 5.81 104504 3.53 98896 8.52 27084 13.95 8250 0.80
Apr 224548 7.76 135299 4.57 133441 11.50 13362 6.88 30831 3.01
May 216720 7.49 234721 7.93 77848 6.71 13464 6.93 82385 8.03
Jun 325805 11.26 358657 12.12 125801 10.84 14722 7.58 143931 14.03
Jul 275946 9.54 427429 14.45 40153 3.46 15351 7.91 176285 17.19
Aug 420179 14.53 522403 17.66 140078 12.07 14892 7.67 227411 22.17
Sep 582916 20.15 500675 16.93 314041 27.07 14841 7.64 216959 21.15
Oct 203031 7.02 287199 9.71 35488 3.06 14284 7.36 105372 10.27










































































































Conveyance Cost for Agriculture
Energy Benefits
Conveyance Cost for Urban
Figure 5 – The monthly changes in economic benefits with respect to their sources 
Distribution  of  the  Economic  Benefits  among Countries  and  Between  Sectors: So  far, 
aggregate measures of economic benefits and water recourses allocations are presented. In this 
section,  first  country based monthly  allocation  of  the benchmark  model  benefits  then  their 
associated sources are presented in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Figure 7 also provides monthly 
water withdrawals by countries. Figures present that Turkey and Iraq obtain most of their benefits 
during partially autumn and heavily summer  and fall periods.  These benefits can  be mainly 
attributed to energy generations for Turkey and agricultural water withdrawals for Iraq (Figure 
7). The difference between Iraq and Turkey is clearly identified by the blue and purple bars 
indicating energy and agricultural benefits, respectively. Syria is different from both Turkey and
Iraq that she obtains benefits  from both energy  and  agriculture.  It  can be concluded that an 
integrated  basi n  management  makes  Turkey  an  energy generating  and  Iraq  an  agricultural 
country.  Though  the highest total  net  economic  benefits are generated  from the basin-wide
optimization disregarding country specific unilateral objectives, this scenario requires voluntary 
participation  of  upstream  country  Turkey  with  a  rational  compensation  payment15
(Kucukmehmetoglu 2010). The integrated basin model forces Turkey minimally withdraw water 






































Figure 6– Net country benefits by months
4.2. Impacts of Energy Demand Changes on Agriculture under Various Management 
Scenarios. 
In this section, under the integrated and disintegrated basin management scenarios, the impacts of 
changes  in energy demand  over  a year  on  agriculture  ar e the bases  for  analyses.  Bas ed on 
scenarios identified in Table 1 and Figure 3, Table 5 is prepared to show the marginal impacts of 
scenario  changes on  net  economic  benefits and  water uses.  In order  to convey  the  marginal 
changes to the reader, obtained values are indexed to the benchmark model assuming integrated 
basin and uniform energy prices (not considering any changes in energy demand over the year). 
Benchmark  model  values  are also presented  in  the same  table to  the reader to  convey  the 16
magnitude of values. Figure 8 presents the graphic equivalence of Table 5 with actual values. The 




























































































































































































Withdrawal Benefit for Iraq
Energy Benefıts
Water Withdrawal
Figure 7 – Monthly net economic benefits of the countries by their sources and monthly water 
withdrawals: Turkey; (b) Syria; (c) Iraq17
 Comparison of IC and DC Scenarios: For an integrated system, the winner of the scenario is, 
mainly the basin itself as a whole, and specifically downstream country Iraq. As can be seen 
in  Table  5,  while Iraq’s  benefit  is  declining  (100.0→93.5)  in  the  disintegrated  basin 
management,  Turkey  and  Syria’s  net  economic  benefits  are  increasing  (respectively
100→102.7,  100→100.6).  In  the  same  scenario,  the decrease  in  energy  benefits  in  the 
upstream Turkey and Syria refers to increases in agricultural withdrawals, which mean less 
water for energy generation. The upstream water uses have mainly negative agricultural and 
partially energy effects on Iraq.
 Comparison of IC and IV Scenarios and Comparison of DC and DV Scenarios: In the 
scenarios encountering  the  impacts of energy price changes (higher  energy prices  when 
temperature decreases below 15
◦C  in upstream Turkey), ther e are similar  impacts in both 
integrated and disi ntegrated managements; however, the decrease in agricultural benefits is 
much more for the disintegrated scenarios in Iraq (100→80.3)  in Table 5. The reason for that 
during cold weather period Turkey rationally uses (releases) the water fromtheir reservoirs 
for  the  benefit  of energy;  conversely,  in  this  process,  water  releases  take  places  from 
reservoirs in Turkey much earlier than the period needed for Iraq. It is noteworthy that in an 
integrated basin management the reservoirs in Turkey have positive economic contribution to 
the downstream countries at the expense of her own unilateral benefits.      
 Water Withdrawals and Water Releases for Energy Generation: Table 5 provides water 
withdrawals for urban and agriculture. The changes in energy demand have limited impact on 
urban water withdrawals as compared to agricultural uses. The reasons for that the economic 
values of water in urban area are 6 times and the return flow rates are 2.3 times more than the 
values  in a griculture.  It  is  clear that  in  an  integrated basin  management  Iraq  utilizes her  
agricultural potent at the expense of agricultural withdrawals in Turkey. In the meantime, 
increasing energy demand in Turkey does the similar effects on agricultural withdrawals. By 
assumption,  the  invariant  agricultural  productivity  assumption  makes both  upstream  and 
downstream  lands  indifferent, but unused  water  has potential  of generating energy until 
reaching to the  Gu lf  from  head  losses.  Unless Turkey’s  losses  from  an integrated basin 
management are compensated, Turkey would rather rationally prefer acting unilaterally to 
take  advantage of her upstream water contributing  position. Higher winter season energy 
demands  in  Turkey  lead untimely  water  releases  beyond  the  water  holding  capacity  of  18
downstream countries and cause losses from potential benefits in agriculture. In this process, 
the upstream reservoirs in Turkey, on the other hand, enable inter-temporal water resources 
allocations by delaying water flows, and provide benefits to the downstream countries.   
Table 5– The indexed results of various management and energy demand scenarios: Net 
economic benefits and water withdrawals in reference to the benchmark model (Index=100)




Assumption for Energy Price






















Total 1087379   100 102,7 119,1 123,7
Withdrawal 191083   100 133,4 99,1 132,3
Agriculture 50393   100 226,7 96,7 222,3
Urban 140690   100 100,0 100,0 100,0





r Total 3764   100 247,9 97,7 241,8
Agriculture 2529   100 320,2 96,6 311,1













Total 292640   100 100,6 100,0 95,7
Withdrawal 161445   100 105,5 100,0 95,3
Agriculture 83396   100 103,7 100,0 99,7
Urban 83837   100 100,0 100,0 84,3





r Total 6092   100 103,2 100,0 98,3
Agriculture 5272   100 103,7 100,0 99,9












Total 1512772   100 93,5 100,0 84,6
Withdrawal 1380015   100 93,3 100,0 82,7
Agriculture 826436   100 91,8 99,9 80,3
Urban 553578   100 100,0 100,0 91,8





r Total 76061   100 91,9 99,9 80,0
Agriculture 71635   100 91,4 99,9 79,2

























Total 2892791   100 97,7 107,2 100,4
Withdrawal 1732542   100 98,9 99,9 89,4
Agriculture 960225   100 99,9 99,8 89,4
Urban 778105   100 100,0 100,0 92,5





r Total 85918   100 99,5 99,8 88,4
Agriculture 79436   100 99,5 99,8 88,0
Urban 6482   100 100,0 100,0 93,2
IC: Integrated Management; Constant Energy Demand in the Basin DC: Disintegrated Management; Constant Energy Demand in the Basin
IV: Integrated Management; Variable Energy Demand in Turkey DV: Disintegrated Management; Variable Energy Demand in Turkey
Table  5 presents that agriculture  is  the primary sector being  affected  from  management and 
energy demand scenarios.  In order to  present  the country based  monthly  effects of  changes,
Figures 8a,b,c are prepared. Analyses are as follows:19
 Impacts of  Management  Strategies  (Integrated and disintegrated): As compared to the 
disintegrated  basin  management,  the  integrated  basin  management  causes  significant 
economic benefit decreases in Turkey between April and October. In contrast, in Iraq, during 
August  and  September (Figure  8),  when  water  is short, there are significant  agricultural 
economic benefit increases in the integrated basin management. Syrian benefits are almost 
indifferent due to her intermediate geographic location in the basin. In the water withdrawal 
values, the scenarios assuming  changes in energy  demand  hardly  results  in alterations  in 
water withdrawals for the countries in the integrated management scenario alone; however, 
these  alterations  are  prominent  in  Iraq  when  the  basin  management  is  disintegrated.
Especially, during June-September (Figure 8), water withdrawals in Turkey and Iraq present 
significant changes.    
 The Impacts of Energy Price Changes in the Upstream Turkey for the Integrated Basin 
Management Scenarios: In Figures 8a, b, c, it can be seen that the changes in the energy 
prices in the upstream country Turkey do not cause significant changes in water withdrawals 
for the  integrated basin  management scenarios. The reason for that the  integrated  basin 
management  still  considers  the  valuable  water  uses  in a griculture  at  the  downstream 
countries.  Also,  it  is  still  possi ble  to  generate  energy  while  transferring  water  to  the 
downstream agricultural zones.
 The Impacts of Energy Price Changes in the Up stream Turkey for the Disintegrated Basin 
Management Scenarios:  In the disintegrated basin management scenarios, the energy price 
changes in upstream country Turkey make her unilaterally adapt to new situations to generate 
max imum net economic benefit. That means more water releases during low temperature 
periods to generate energy, and untimely more water intakes to the downstream countries 
beyond their ARC enabling to postpone water withdrawals to the high water demand periods. 
The disintegrated basin management puts Iraq in a passive position, and her water withdrawal 

























































Benefit  -Integrated Basin & Constant Energy Price
Benefit  -Disintegrated Basin & Constant Energy Price
Benefit  -Integrated Basin & Variable Energy Price
Benefit  -Disintegrated Basin & Variable Energy Price
Water  - Integrated Basin & Constant Energy Price
Water  - Disintegrated Basin & Constant Energy Price
Water  - Integrated Basin Variable Energy Price
Water  - Disintegrated Basin & Variable Energy Price
Figure 8 – Net economic benefits and total water withdrawals under effects of varying energy 
demands in Turkey: (a) Turkey; (b) Syria; (c) Iraq
For agriculture and energy sectors, there are several conclusions can be derived:
 Regarding the total net economic benefit generated from the basin, it is certain that integrated 
basi n  management  is  superior  to the  disintegrated  basin  management.  Because,  in the
disintegrated  basin  management,  the  upstream  optimization  behaviors  create  certain 
preconditions to the downstream countries, the total net economic benefits derived from the 
basi n becomes an outcome of partial country based optimizations. Thus, the sum of partial 
optimization results never exceeds the total net economic benefits derived from the integrated 
basi n management (IC:100→DC:97,7; IV:107,2→DV:100,4).21
 The  changes  in t he  upstream  energy demand and  their  negative  impacts  on downstream 
countries can be resolved by means of alternative energy policies. For example, during cold 
periods or untimely  energy  demand  changes, the  inclination  to  the  hydroelectric  energy 
sources  can  be  prevented  by  providing  alternative  energy  sources.  The  energy  rich 
downstream countries may rationally provide or subsidize ener gy to the upstream country to 
maxi mize their economic benefits from the basin. Similarly, any alternative energy source 
investments  in  the  upstream  county Turkey  can  be promoted  and/or subsidized by  the 
negatively affected downstream counties in order to attain timely water releases from the 
upstream reservoirs.
 It is noteworthy that the integrated basin management uses the ARC in Turkey for the overall 
benefit of the ETRB. In any consideration of integrated basin management, authorities should 
consider the monetary costs born to the upstream country Turkey from the construction of 
reservoir infrastructure.       
Though the case study is designed to encompass a single year 12 period optimization model, at 
the brim of the Global Climatic Change, the existence of reservoirs can be further evaluated for 
the multiple year fluctuations in rainfalls in the ETRB. The ITETRBM is technically capable of 
measuring these impacts and creates a base for further sophistications in any parameters and 
functional relations.
5. CONCLUSION
The scenarios has shown that  integrated basin  management are always  more  productive and 
superior to the any disintegrated basin management. Therefore, coordination among all parties, 
which can be provinces, regions, and countries in a basin, is an absolute necessity. 
As a result  of sensitivity  analyses, Turkey’s energy policy is  a  direct concern of Iraq as  a 
downstream country of the ETRB. The water releases in Turkey during the cold weather periods 
to generate energy have negative effects on Iraq. In these effects, Turkey has two different roles: 
In the first one, the ARC built in and by Turkey enables to store water and actualizes inter-
temporal  water r esources  allocations.  The built  infrastructure  provides significant  economic 
benefits to the basin and especially to the downstream countries. In the second one, the water 
releases in Turkey during  cold  weathers to generate  energy  result  in  excess  of  water  intake22
beyond the ARC of downstream countries to be able to make inter-temporal resources allocation 
in their land. This prevents the downstream countries have additional net economic benefits from 
the water stored at the upstream country Turkey.     
For agricultural and energy policies, two assertions can be made:  
 The energy (petroleum and natural gas) rich downstream countries (Syria and Iraq) may have 
effect on closing the upstream country Turkey’s energy deficits during cold weather, and in 
this way, they may have a positive effect on the timing of water releases for their beneficial 
uses in the downstream regions.       
 Similar to increasi ng ener gy demand during cold periods, the hot periods may show other 
higher energy demands for air conditioning and cooling. This shows that heating is not the 
only sources of energy demand; therefore, these policies needs to be adopted with respect to 
the countries’ level of development, socio economic dynamics of the region, and climatic 
changes. 
Integrated basin management not considering the separating impacts of borders can be pursued 
only when the necessary compensation mechanisms are developed for those who lose benefits for 
higher benefits of whole and others. The upstream and downstream concern is the main dilemma 
for  an integrated basi n management.  It  is  noteworthy  that  unless the concerns of  upstream 
country Turkey are addressed, the downstream countries’ concerns cannot be addressed properly
due to geography based sequential utilization of water resources in the ETRB. 
It is usually expected that any water development project will improve the countries’ economic 
prosperity; however,  wa ter should not  be  considered the only  way of economic  growth and 
development in the region. Other areas of trade and development should be used for the welfare 
gain  of  the  region,  so  that the  alternative  areas of  coalitions  might bring  parties  act  in  a 
partnership in activating the regional water resources potentials. In other words, water resources 
allocation should not be the only base of cooperation, but should be a limited part of regional 
economic coalition and perspective. In that way, many specific energy and agricultural problems 
can be solved simultaneously.
Finally, to achieve an integrated basin management and to develop exact policies throughout the 
basin, there is need to have a detailed database infrastructure. But,primarily, there is need to have 23
coordinated  actions of  provinces,  regions,  and  countries in  the  basin.  That  is  a  political, 
economic, socio-cultural necessity of the parties involved in the ETRB.    
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APPENDIX EK A
Indices 
i:         dem and nodes (1 to 63)
j & l:  supply nodes (1 to 45)
t: periods (1 to 12)
ag:      set of agricultural demand nodes
ur:      set of urban demand nodes
st(j), ss(j), si(j):         the supply node subsets fo r Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, respectively
TA(i), SA(i), IA(i):      sunsets for the agricultural demand nodes fo r Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, respectively
TU(i), SU(i), IU(i):     sunsets for the urban demand nodes for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, respectively
TEt, SEt, IEt:        energy price subsets at time t forTurkey, Syria, and Iraq, respectively
Variables
NEB:         total benefit net of transportation costs   ($)
NEBTSI : net economic benefit of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in the grand coalition (=NEB)    ($)
Qjlt: inter-nodal flow  (node j to node l)                                            (Mm
3)   
Wjit water transferred from supply node j to demand node i at time t (Mm
3)
NEBT: net economic benefit of Turkey, all countries acting independently ($)
NEBS/T: net economic benefit of Syria given Turkey’s action, all countries acting independently                    ($)
NEBI/T&S: net economic benefit of Iraq given first Turkey’s and then Syria’s actions, all countries 
acting independently                      ($)
Parameters
Cag:    agricultural water transport unit cost            ($ per Mm
3-km)
Cur:    urban water transport unit cost                ($ per Mm
3-km)
Vag:   agriculture water unit value                      ($ per Mm3)
Vur:   urban water unit value                       ($ per Mm
3)
Css:      internodal water transport unit cost             ($ per Mm
3-km)
Dii: distance from supply node j to demand node i (km)
Djl: distance from supply node j to supply node l (km)26
Ljl: length of link from supply node j to supply node l (km)
Pet:        energy price for electricity at time t               ($  per MWh)
Ej: electric generation rate for node j dam (MWh per Mm3)
Minag:  minimum agricultural consumption rate           (Mm
3 per ha)
Maxag:  maximum agricultural consumption rate           (Mm
3 per ha)
Minur:  minimum urban consumption rate                  (Mm
3 per inhabitant)
Maxur: maximum urban consumption rate                  (Mm
3 per inhabitant)
ELjt: reservoir evaporation loss at supply node j at time t      (Mm
3)
RFijt: return f low rate from demand node i to supply node j at time t
RSjt-1 water stored at time t-1 to transfer time t in the reservoir j (Mm
3)
Si:  size of demand node i (hectare for agricultural nodes, inhabitants for urban nodes)
Tjt:    tributary inflow at node j at time t    (Mm
3)
RCj: reservoir capacity at node j (Mm
3)
APPENDIX B: DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS 
As detailed  for the ETRBM in Kucukmehmetoglu (2002, 2009) and Ku cukmehmetoglu & Guldmann (2004), and 
Kucukmehmetoglu et al. (2010) the demand-supply data various system parameters and assumptions are as follows:  
Supply Data 
 Data on the water contributions of each riparian country are available in Kolars (1986, 1992, 1994), Kolars and 
Mitchell  (1991), Kliot (1994), Bagis (1989). From those figures, for each tributary of the Euphrates  and the 
Tigris a tributary f low amount is derived.
 The return flow rate is assumed 35% for agriculture, and 80% for urban use. 
 Evaporation rates (per-km
2) from the reservoirs are computed for the three riparian countries based on observed 
annual  evaporation  figures given the reservoir surface areas  for the major reservoirs in the Euphrates basin 
(Altinbilek, 1997) and then the estimated evaporation rates are applied to the other reservoirs. 
Demand Data
 Total planned irrigable land areas for each riparian country are available in the literature, with: 1,770,956 ha for 
Turkey, 1,040,000 ha for Syria, and 5,833,000 ha for Iraq, or a total of 8,643,956 ha for the whole region along 
the two rivers. Those values are assigned to 21 agricultural districts (nodes) in the Euphrates basin, and 16 in the 
Tigris basin.
 Irrigable areas are only available at  country or  regional level for Syria and Iraq. The delineation of irrigation 
districts was made using existing irrigation maps. 
 Due to a lack of spatial information, agricultural productivity  (Vag) is assumed to be the same throughout the 
region, and crop diversity and double cropping options are ignored. 
 The agricultural districts are located close to the two rivers, with the water conveyance distance varying mostly 
between 4 and 40 km.
 There are 8 urban demand nodes in Turkey (South Eastern Anatolia Region), 8 in Syria, and 10 in Iraq. These 
nodes  are constituted by cities having 100,000 or more inhabitants. Historical population data fo r these cities, 
from 1965 to 1995, have been used to estimate populations in year 2040.  
Agriculture and Urban Water Values
 Agriculture  and  urban water values  are derived from  Dinar  and Wolf (1994b) and  Howitt, Mann,  and  Vaux 
(1982), and the following values are selected: Vur= $150,000/Mm
3, Vag = $25,000/Mm
3.27
Maximum and Minimum Consumption Rates
 Using the upper-bound estimate  of  D inar and Wolf  (1994a), Maxag = 0.020 Mm
3/ha is selected as the upper 
bound of  water  withdrawal  and Maxur=0.000106 Mm3/capita is selected as the upper water use  rate. Because 
some districts may not be irrigated and some urban areas are not served, minimum withdrawals are chosen to be 
Minag = 0.0 Mm
3/ha and Minur=0.0 Mm
3/capita. 
Water Transportation Costs
 Each  demand  node  is  assigned  to the most accessible supply node  that distances are  strait  line  distances 
measured  through  ma p  analysis.  Then  transportation  costs  are  derived  from  Hirshleifer  et  al.  (1 969)  as 
Cag=$850/Mm
3-km for agricultural uses, Cur=$4,958/Mm
3-km  for urban uses, and Css = $850 per Mm
3-km fo r 
inter-basin links.
Electricity Generation
 The average electric generation rate is known as 0.87 kWh per foot-head and acre-feet of water (Gibbons, 1986). 
This value have been converted into electricity generation per Mm
3 of  water released from the head of the dam. 
The literature provides head heights of dams  from the riverbed  on the main branch of the Euphrates (Bilen, 
1994). The he ad heights for the other dams are estimated to range between 20-35 m, in view of the change in 
elevation through Syria and Iraq.
Additional Data and Assumptions needed for the ITETRBM
For each reservoir, there are two types of water holding capacities: dead and active reserves. While the dead reserve 
capacity has  no u se  fo r  en ergy  generation and  water  distribution,  the  active  one  is critical  fo r  inter-temporal 
allocations. Those active  reservoir  capacities are  almost completely available in Turkey and partially in Syria and 
Iraq (Altınbilek 1997, 2004; UNEP 2001). In Turkey, the total active storage capacity is 63.3 Mm
3. The 47.6 Mm
3 of 
this total is in the Euphrates, and the remainder 15.7 Mm
3 in the Tigris basin. In the Euphrates basin, in Syria and 
Iraq, the known total active storage capacities are respectively 9 and 10.4 Mm
3. In the Tigris basin of Iraq, the only 
available active reservoir  capacity is Mosul Dam with 8.2 Mm
3. The remainders, in Iraq and Syria, are derived by 
multiplying total storages by the average ratio of active reservoir capacities to total storage in the basin. This ratio is 
obtained from available reservoir figures in the basin. The computed average ratio is .52, and the calculated ranges of 
the ratios vary from .40 to .80. In the text, the reservoir capacities refer only the active reserve capacities but not the 
dead reserves.
 12 monthly periods (t=1→12) are selected for the application of inter-temporal allocation. 
 Kliot (1994:  p.106, 107)  provides monthly variations of the  Euphrates  and the Tigris in graph  fo rm. These 
fi gures are  aggregated into the 12 working periods and their ratio is used as multiplier for the tributary  flows 
used in  Kucukmehmetoglu  (2002).  These  multipliers  are mT1 ...  mT12, and  they  can  be  used  to  compute 
periodically defined tributary flows for each supply node asTjt = Tj·mTt.
 The water demand is expected to vary from dry to rainy season. The values of water used in these 12 monthly 
periods are the same, but quantities demanded are different. Therefore, adjustments of  the maximum withdrawal 
limits for the 12 periods are needed. In the literature, İlhan & Utku (1998) provide monthly variations of water 
demands in the GAP area of Turkey. The monthly figures are converted into 12 water demand multipliers, by 
computing the monthly ratios of water demanded in the total annual demand (mMaxag1 ... mMaxag12), then these 
ratios  are used  as multiplier to adjust maximum water withdrawal limits Mm
3 per-ha in agriculture (Maxagt = 
Maxag · mMaxagt). The same procedure is applied  for maximum urban water demands Mm3 per-inhabitant by 
usingmonthly Istanbul metropolitan area water use figures (İSKİ, 2003) to obtain the periodical water demand 
ratios (mMaxur1 ... mMaxur12). Then conversion is done by multiplying the maximum urban water demands Mm
3
per-inhabitant by these multipliers (Maxurt = Maxur · mMaxurt).
 The constant evaporation  values  in  Kucukmehmetoglu  (2002)  ne ed  to  be  apportioned  into  12  periods.  The 
necessary multipliers are adapted  from the graph provided by Hurst (1952)  for  the Aswan Dam over the Nile. 
Monthly  evaporation  figures  are  aggregated  into  12  periods,  and  then  the  ratios  of  p eriodical  to  annual 
evaporation  total  are  calculated  (mEL1 ... mEL12). Then the  constant  evaporation values  are  apportioned  to 
periods by using these ratios as multipliers (ELjt = ELj ·mELt).  
 Energy values are assumed to be the same throughout the year in calculating the economic benefits from water 
releases from reservoirs. But this assumption is relaxed in this research for the analyses.